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This paper is about the meaning of tolerance in science from a philosophical perspective (e.g. that of Carnap,
Quine, and Davidson) as related to virtues and the context of changing languages and paradigms of science.
The notion of “science” is used in the English sense of the term; that is as denoting the natural sciences and
mathematics, but not the humanities and the social sciences. The common roots of tolerance in the Modern
philosophy of science is found in the Enlightenment, particularly the work of Voltaire, whom both Quine
and Popper refer to as an authority on the issue.
1. INTRODUCTION: TOLERANCE AND SCIENCE –
AN IMPOSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP?
This paper1 is more of an essayistic synopsis of some syste matic thoughts and his-
torical observations rather than an elaborated and coherent analysis of a topic
which has long been neglected in the philosophy of science as well as in general
philosophy. It will start with some preliminary remarks about tolerance and science
in order to narrow down the issues that will be discussed. The second part brings
in a historical perspective on the subject in order to show why the topic is relevant
for the philosophy of science in modern times. The following two sections will
deal with some systematic aspects of tolerance in science in the modern discussion.
Here, the focus will be on analytical philosophy (Carnap, Quine and Davidson)
on the one hand, and critical rationalism (Popper and Albert) on the other. The
main part of the paper will be devoted to the meaning of tolerance and related
virtues in the context of changing languages of science and changing paradigms
of science. Throughout the paper, ‘science’ will be used in the English meaning,
though a broadly interpreted one: The term is meant to denote the natural sciences
and mathematics, but not the humanities and the social sciences. 
This paper is a slightly modified and extended version of my talk delivered at the conference ‘Toler-
ation and Tolerance’ of the History of Ideas Research Centre in Krakow, October 18th–20th, 2012.
English translations of German sources in the text are mine. Many thanks to Janelle Pötzsch, who
polished the English of this printed version of the talk.
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At first glance, the terms ‘tolerance’ and ‘science’ seem to address quite hetero-
geneous or even alien areas of human conduct and human action. Tolerance stems
from the religious and political sphere and developed into a key concept of moral
(or practical) philosophy during the Enlightenment. Science, on the other hand,
is a topic of theoretical philosophy – of logic, epistemology, and methodology.
Moreover, tolerance seems to be located in a field of subjective virtues and attitudes
like respect, understanding, forbearance and, at least sometimes, a feeling of su-
periority. It is a virtue whose limits of relevance and application are quite difficult
to define. Science, however, seems to represent objectivity at its best – truth, exac-
titude, demonstration and empirical verifi cation, fixed methodological rules and
rational foundation. Its limits seem to be clear-cut. Finally, tolerance seems to be
inseparably connected to personal opinions and ideological word-views: Within
certain limits, opinions and world-views are sustained by a tolerant person, though
they are not accepted or even adapted. Science, on the other hand, seems to have
no place for such opinions or world-views. Its laws, theories and propositions are
either right or wrong. Scientists do not have to suffer ambiguous and uncontrol-
lable statements of other people. So much about the ‘everyday speech’ about ‘tol-
erance’ and ‘science’ and its superficialities.
A closer look, which takes into account a more precise definition of tolerance,
can reveal its potential function for science: Tolerance is an attitude of a person or
a social group towards convictions, beliefs, actions or habits of other persons or
groups, which are understood as relevant for some reason, which are also under-
stood as false (or at least as deviating from accepted norms) for some reason, and
which are condoned (‘geduldet’), even though the first person or group may be in
a position to suppress or punish the opposite party. While tolerance, properly jus-
tified, should be understood as an ethical or epistemic virtue, toleration is its re-
spective and verifiable expression or behaviour. 
Now, keeping this definition in mind, what does it mean to argue for tolerance
in science? Several qualifications are necessary in order to specify this question:
First, I would like to stress that I discuss tolerance in science, not tolerance with
science. I do not discuss, for example, the intolerance of the church with respect
to Copernicus or Galileo. I concern myself with, e.g., tolerant or intolerant be-
haviour among Newtonians and Leibnizians or Cartesians in 18th century physics,
or among formalists and intuitivists or constructivists in 20th century mathematics.
Secondly, I won’t deal with tolerance in the context of everyday-controversies
among scientists. This means that I won’t discuss issues about outward reputation,
resources and institutional influence or power. Tolerance in such disputes is not
peculiar for science, and therefore out of the scope of this talk. Thirdly, I will take
science as an ideal enterprise, which is governed, or should be governed, by certain
common values as formulated in particular by Robert Merton; Universalism, dis-
interestedness, organized skepticism and communism (i.e. the common property
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of scientific knowledge) should rule science and scientific conduct. The question
is whether and why we might need tolerance in addition to these widely accepted
values, as an epistemic or ethical virtue of science. If the ideal scientific discourse
is coined by a common search for truth, and ruled by organised skepticism, do we
still need tolerance as a surplus? The counter question is whether tolerance in sci-
ence does not undermine the rational standards of science. If we have good reasons
to refuse the scientific claims of an opposing person or group, doesn’t scientific ra-
tionality require us not to tolerate such claims, but to try to eliminate it from the
scientific discourse? And if the answer to this question should be ‘no’ or, in other
words, if tolerance is a necessary element at least of some scientific discourses, fur-
ther questions emerge: What are the features of these discourses that make toler-
ance indispensable? What are the limits of tolerance which have to be drawn in
order not to hinder or even to end the progress of science? I will address only some
of these questions in the second half of my paper. Beforehand, it may be inform-
ative and helpful to insert a short digression on ‘tolerance in science’ from the per-
spective of the history of ideas.
2. ‘HISTORY OF IDEAS IN A NUTSHELL’: TOLERANCE IN CLASSICAL AND
MODERN SCIENCE
For our purposes, it’s advisable to begin with a distinction between ‘classical’ and
‘modern science’. The first ideal dominated science and its philosophy from An-
tiquity to the 19th century; the second one developed in the late 19th century and
is generally accepted today.2 To put this distinction very shortly: The general clas-
sical premise was that science gains invariable, true and indisputable knowledge
of nature and man himself. In other words: The idea of science from Aristotle to
the late 19th century was shaped by the conviction that scientific knowledge is
epistémé in the traditional sense. One important aspect, perhaps even the most
dominating aspect, of most traditional attempts to demarcate science was to draw
a line between epistémé in this strong sense and weaker forms of knowledge, which
are not certain and may even be fallacious and deceiving. Scientia, science, Wis-
senschaft in its classical meaning is meant to establish one (and only one) logical
system of propositions for each area of experience. Classical science is unitary in
the sense that it does not allow for different theories within different conceptual
frameworks that describe and explain the same field of experience. If two or more
such theories occur, the classical ideal of science demands that all but one are false
and can be demonstrated to be false. This ‘unitarianism’ with respect to scientific
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truth was an essential aspect of most influential philosophies of science from the
17th century onwards: Both classical empiricism from Bacon to Mill as well as clas-
sical rationalism from Descartes to Wolff are unitarian in this sense. Kant’s tran-
scendental foundation of science picked up this feature and carried it over to the
heydays of Neokantianism and even to the Erlangen school of Constructivism. 
In classical science and its philosophy, we hardly encounter serious and interesting
discussions about tolerance: From the point of view of the history of the idea of
tolerance, science is a downright latecomer in comparison to religious and political
thinking. ‘Tolerance’ in religion and politics was an important achievement of
modern times that was brought about both by early modern processes of secular-
ization and the insights of the Enlightenment that abandoned the idea of absolute
truth of one religion or one political system. At the same time, the Enlightenment
declared science to be the field where privileged knowledge with absolute truth
can be found. This special epistemic status of science precluded debates about tol-
erance in science or philosophy of science; as far as I can see, they simply did not
exist. To give just one example: Schlüter’s extensive study of tolerance in the French
Enlightenment entails a detailed and differentiated index on ‘tolerance’, ‘intoler-
ance’ and related terms. Among the nearly 100 lemmas, no single one deals with
science.3
The lock-out of tolerance from scientific debates does not mean, of course, that
no controversies or battles about scientific issues took place – quite the contrary.
The decisive point, however, is that these debates were carried out between parties
which each were convinced that they’re in the possession of the one true system of
science, whereas the opposing party is not. 
I would like to illustrate this by a controversy that is perhaps the best example
of what Thomas S. Kuhn later described as a true conflict between different sci-
entific paradigms, where the members of the struggling scientific communities are
committed to different conceptual frameworks and live, ontologically speaking,
in different worlds. I am alluding to the famous controversy between Leibniz and
Newton, where Samuel Clarke played the role of Newton’s governor or, perhaps
better, Newton’s ventriloquist. This dispute was about opposing understandings
of the fundamental concepts of natural philosophy, like space, time, body, matter
and force. Leibniz and Clarke exchanged a couple of letters about these subjects,
without ever convincing each other. Gradually, the tone of these letters got harsher
and harsher. Leibniz starts his last letter by expressing his intention to find out
whether his opponent is only interested in struggles without gaining knowledge,
or in ‘foundations of reason’ and ‘veraciousness’. Eventually, he claimed victory
for his own position with these words: “[…] I believe that any reasonable and un-
prejudiced man will admit that someone [like me], who forced his opponent to
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neglect this principle [of sufficient reason] has proven his position to be absurd
[ihn ad absurdum geführt hat]”.4 Newton, on the other hand, accused Leibniz of
conceptual fraud, dishonesty and moral inferiority. From an outward point of
view, the correspondence ended only because Leibniz died. But actually, the ra-
tional discourse has already ended well before that, because arguments about the
true natural philosophy had turned into moral accusations of the opposing party.
No one engaged in this struggle was––due to classical unitarianism––able to con-
sider whether the opposing parties might be right, or what the consequences of
such an assumption might be. The whole epistemological and methodological
framework of classical science excluded the very possibility of forbearing with the
opposite doctrine. In general: Being convinced of the absolute truth of one’s own
system is a death sentence for tolerance and toleration, when incompatible scientific
systems are involved. This is the important lesson the controversy between Newton
and Leibniz provides with respect to tolerance. And it also holds for comparable
foundational controversies within classical science in general. 
However, this traditional image of science as an epistemologically privileged en-
deavour (in the sense of unitarianism) was given up by the end of the 19th century:
Science itself underwent revolutionary changes, which were interpreted by most
philosophers and historians of science as epistemological disruptions. They were
brought about by internal developments rather than by external, social, political
or philosophical influences. Most influential in this respect was the discovery of
non-Euclidean geometries. Virtually as important was another development in
mathematical physics: The rise of alternative and empirically equivalent axiomatic
systems within rational mechanics and other areas. Both developments paved the
way for the conventionalism of Henri Poincaré and Pierre Duhem as a genuinely
new philosophy of science. They were also grist to the mill of a modernised em-
piricism, as Ernst Mach’s phenomenalism and William James’s pragmatism. A
common denominator of all these strands of empirical philosophy is that they did
not adhere to classical unitarianism. Instead, they accepted a plurality of equivalent
scientific theories that govern the same area of experience. Consequently, James
drew this analogy between politics and science in his book The Pluralistic Universe:
“The pluralistic world is […] more like a federal republic than like an empire or
a kingdom.”5
The new pluralism dethroned the old idea of absolute scientific truth of a sci-
entific theory. This means that in James’s ‘federal republic’ of science, the concept
of truth was either ‘abandoned’ as an epistemic distinction of first axioms of science
and mathematics (as in conventionalism), or it was deflated to weaker forms like
the ‘economy’ of descriptions of phenomena or ‘success’ of theories as instrumental
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devices (as in phenomenalism and pragmatism). My thesis is that this ‘democra-
tisation’ of scientific truth made it possible for ‘tolerance’ to enter the agenda of
philosophy of science. Moreover, one might argue that the concept of tolerance
became a necessary concept in philosophy of science because of this process of ‘de-
mocratisation’ (cf. part 3 and 4).
However, the beginnings of explicit philosophical reflections on ‘tolerance in
science’ are difficult to discern. In Poincaré, we find some hints that it makes good
sense to be cautious and hesitant when different conventions or sets of conventions
have to be chosen from. Different options have different advantages and disad-
vantages, and it can be damaging for science to disqualify and discard some options
too early. We find similar views in Mach’s philosophy of science, especially with
regard to basic principles and methods of science. James, however, is most explicit
in this respect. He underlines the pragmatist view that science always serves dif-
ferent interests, and different interests imply different perspectives on reality,
which––in itself––never can be grasped as a unique one. Consequently, he con-
siders uniqueness of truth (or unitarianism, as I called it) as a mere illusion: Sci-
entific beliefs are in this sense on equal footings with other beliefs. It is worth
quoting him in some length in order to make explicit the emerging relation of
‘tolerance in science’ to the new understanding of ‘scientific truth’. The quotation
points at the need to decide willingly for and against certain beliefs in concrete sit-
uations, and that we are ill-advised when we postpone necessary decisions and
simply wait until some super-human, believe-independent truth reveals itself: 6
Were we scholastic absolutists, there might be more excuse. If we had an infal-
lible intellect with its objective certitudes, we might feel ourselves disloyal to
such a perfect knowledge organ of knowledge in not trusting to it exclusively,
in not waiting for its releasing word. But if we are empiricists, if we believe
that no bell in us tolls to let us know for certain when truth is in our grasp,
then it seems a piece of idle fantasticality to preach so solemnly our duty of
waiting for the bell. Indeed we may wait if we will—I hope you do not think
that I am denying that—but if we do so, we do so at our peril as much as if we
believed. In either case we act, taking our life in our hands. 
No one of us should issue vetoes to the other, nor should we bandy words of
abuse. We ought, on the contrary, delicately and profoundly to respect one an-
other’s mental freedom – then only shall we bring about the intellectual repub-
lic; then only shall we have the spirit of inner tolerance without which all outer
tolerance is soulless, and which is empiricism’s glory; then only shall we live
and let live, in speculative as well as in practical things. 
Helmut Pulte132
Id.: The Will to Believe (1896). In: Writings 1878–1899, ed. by G. E. Myers, New York: The Library
of America 1992, pp. 457–479, p. 478.
6
The end of this quotation makes it quite clear that James’s plea for tolerance is a
universal one, including both practical decisions in ethics or religious beliefs as
well as speculative or theoretical decisions in science or philosophy. So at the turn
of the century, ‘tolerance’ was articulated as a virtue also of science, at the latest by
William James. This virtue is both an ethical and an epistemic one: James’s justi-
fications of tolerance are based on the insight that our interests both trigger our
scientific research of reality and are part of this reality. This means that interests
are relevant for us both as knowledge-acquiring beings and as acting beings. As
we have no privileged access to absolute truth of certain beliefs, and as certain be-
liefs correspond to certain interests, we are well-advised to tolerate other beliefs
and interests. We gain more knowledge and act better when we do. Tolerance thus
becomes a matter of scientific prudence. This implies, however, that scientific pru-
dence can no longer distinguish between belief and knowledge in science. I will
come back to this problematic point of James’s argument later. 
3. FROM ‘PSEUDO-TOLERANCE’ TO TOLERANCE: 
ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
The third part of my talk focuses on what I call ‘pseudo-tolerance’ and ‘tolerance’
in twentieth-century analytical philosophy. As regards this issue, I think that Car-
nap, Quine and Davidson are the most interesting thinkers to consider. Tolerance
here becomes a topic for exactly the same reason mentioned before: While the log-
ical empiricists followed a program of ‘unified science’ [Einheitswissenschaft], they
were confronted by Poincaré’s conventionalism and Mach’s phenomenalism with
counter-arguments to this project. These arguments became all the more serious
for members of the Vienna Circle as they modeled their scientific philosophy in
the tradition of Mach and Poincaré. And even the development of mathematics
from Hilbert onwards––Hilbert being another ‘saint’ of logical empiricism––
pointed towards a plurality of scientific languages and systems. Carnap, in his main
work Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928) more or less ignored these problems.
Later however, in his second main work Die logische Syntax der Sprache (1934) he
paid attention to the challenge of plurality both in the empirical sciences as well as
in mathematics. Moreover, his attempt to build up a general logical syntax under-
lying all languages of the sciences and mathematics also faces the problem that
logic itself is capable of expressing different structures and different types of syntax.
Carnap’s bold attempt was, so to speak, to extend conventionalism to logic itself. For
this purpose, he formulated a so-called ‘principle of tolerance’: 7
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Our attitude in general […] be formulated by the principle of tolerance [Toler-
anzprinzip]: We do not want to set up prohibitions [Verbote], but establish
conventions [Festsetzungen]. […] In logic, there is no moral. Everyone is at lib-
erty to build up his own logic, i.e. his own form of language as he wishes. All
that is required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss with us, he must state
clearly how he is going to proceed, [he must] give syntactical rules instead of
philosophical arguments.
This principle of tolerance, he states earlier in his book, is his ‘silver bullet’ to over-
come the restrictions of classical logic:8
The first attempts to cast the ship of logic off from the firm coast of classical
forms were certainly bold, considered from the historical point of view. But
they were hampered by the striving after ‘correctness’. Now, however, that im-
pediment is overcome, and before us lays the boundless ocean of unlimited
possibilities.
This Bacon-like rhetoric of new beginning and break-up can be understood only
if we consider the vast range of the principle of tolerance in Carnap’s philosophy.
It has an internal and an external dimension: Internally, with respect to the pro-
gram of logical empiricism, he claims that his principle is adequate to settle the
foundational disputes within mathematics and the empirical sciences. Tolerance
with respect to the choice of the respective mathematical language of science
doesn’t harm scientific rationality, as these languages can always be translated into
each other. For Carnap, there is no need to give up the distinction between scien-
tific knowledge and mere belief, as James did. However, this internal objective tar-
get of tolerance cannot be reached within Carnap’s framework: His idea of syntax
very much depends on the concept of ‘analyticity’, and different languages in his
framework imply different fixations of this concept. This, however, was a core el-
ement of the foundational disputes of the time, for example between logicists and
intuitionists in the foundational dispute of mathematics.9 That Carnap tries to
shift the philosophical disputes to ‘syntax’ and thereby to analyticity that obviously
has to do the philosophical work for him is not without irony. So-called philo-
sophical pseudo-problems, kicked off at the front door of logical empiricism, reen-
ter the stage from the backdoor, named ‘principle of tolerance’. 
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The ‘external’ dimension of this principle, however, is even much more fare-
reaching and fundamental: As Carnap makes clear later, this principle serves as a
cornerstone of his general philosophical outlook, which he characterises as the
“neutral attitude toward the various philosophical forms of language, based on the
principle that everyone is free to use the language most suited to his purpose,
which I held up throughout my life”.10 Carnap’s main idea here is that the principle
of tolerance allows for a certain ontological neutrality with respect to questions
which are ‘external’ to the chosen language itself: Is there an outward metaphysical
reality? What does the structure of the language tell us about this reality?, and so
forth. Carnap holds the view that the choice of a certain language does not imply
any ontological commitments. To be more precise: We can introduce variables
into our language without claiming that they refer to certain outside entities.
Again, further analysis of Carnap’s syntax by Quine and others has shown that
this kind of neutrality cannot work. Carnap himself in later investigations limited
his principle of tolerance by pragmatic demands like simplicity, feasibility and use-
fulness.11 However, and contrary to James, he did not interpret practical success
in realistic terms.
To conclude with Carnap, I would like to stress one more general aspect of the
external dimension of his principle of tolerance: It entails an implicit agenda ac-
cording to which all philosophical problems are problems of syntax. Though his
principle may look quite reasonable to all philosophers working within the tradi-
tion of logical empiricism, it is hardly acceptable for many or even most philoso-
phers working outside this tradition and interested in preserving some of these
traditions: Carnap’s attempt to commit philosophy in general to a language that
fits his demands of syntax means, by and large, to commit philosophy—at least
philosophy of science—to a general ‘mathematical language’. I refute the claim
that all philosophical problems and interests with respect to science can be for-
mulated in such a language. Therefore, I do not regard Carnap’s principle as one
that is about ‘tolerance’. It is rather a principle of ‘pseudo-tolerance’ that masks a
traditional dogmatism of a certain kind. 
Here, I cannot follow up the fate of Carnap’s principle in the further develop-
ment of analytical philosophy. At least I should note that it had certain successors
within the analytical tradition. With Carnap’s principle and Quine’s later critique
of the Two Dogmas of Empiricism the question of radical translation entered the
agenda: All our theories are underdetermined by sense experience. Therefore, if
two representatives of different theories—formulated in different languages—
would like to communicate, the meaning of the words used respectively is not
clearly determined by empirical reference. In order to reach a unique determination
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of meaning, each representative has to perform interpretative efforts in order to un-
derstand his conversational partner. In this context, Quine introduces a “principle
of charity” [Barmherzigkeitsprinzip] according to which all translations from the
alien theory language preserve logical rules, like avoidance of contradictions.12 In
short, Quine’s principle of charity introduces a necessary precondition of scientific
discourse as a normative claim: We should not presume that our opponents adhere
to absurd or irrational beliefs. We should rather—at least until further evidence is
available—assume that they pursue their scientific interests as rationally as we do.
This kind of tolerance—ironically labeled as ‘charity’—seems indispensable for
Quine in order to solve the problem of radical translation, i.e. to make possible
communication across the borders of different scientific theories.
Later, Donald Davidson accused Quine of perpetuating a third dogma of em-
piricism, i.e. to keep up the old dichotomy of empirical content and conceptual
scheme. He wanted to overcome this third dogma, especially in order to master
the challenge that Kuhn’s incommensurability-thesis posed for analytical philoso-
phy. Davidson described his own approach explicitly as an interpretative one, and
insofar comparisons to the hermeneutic tradition suggest themselves and have ac-
tually been drawn.13 Davidson’s main point is that knowledge and interpretation
are rooted in social interaction between humans and their interaction with the world
outside. We interpret each other by assuming that our conversational partner is
also intending to articulate true judgements about the commonly shared world.
And we maximise the understanding of our conversational partner by starting with
the assumption that his judgements are consistent, that they are intended to be
true, and that most of them are indeed true (in the sense of a correspondence the-
ory of truth). Davidson denominates these preconditions of understanding, in-
cluding scientific understanding, as charity.14 They are principles of benevolent
interpretation of someone who uses a different (scientific) language. As such, they
do not yet guarantee scientific understanding: They are no warrantors of under-
standing, but somehow transcendental preconditions of understanding in science.
The road from Carnap over Quine to Davidson seems an interesting one to me:
It is a road that leads from ‘pseudo-tolerance’ to real ‘tolerance’ within analytical
philosophy. And though Davidson’s position certainly entails profound differences
to, say, Dilthey’s and Gadamer’s, one can say that it initiated a certain convergence
of the analytical and hermeneutic tradition.
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4. TOLERANCE AND VERISIMILITUDE: 
ETHICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY IN CRITICAL RATIONALISM
The last part of my paper will highlight a position in philosophy of science that is
also critical with respect to the hermeneutic tradition, but which reveals some con-
vergent tendencies to it as well. It is about Karl R. Popper’s and Hans Albert’s crit-
ical rationalism. It was mainly this tradition that forced analytical philosophers
like Quine and Davidson to dismiss the idea that science can yield certain knowl-
edge: No other strand of modern philosophy of science took leave of the classical
ideal of absolute true scientific knowledge as consequently as this one. To quote
Popper’s famous dictum: “Our science is not knowledge (epistémé): it can never
claim to have attained truth, nor probability.”15
One lesson Popper drew from this epistemological insight into the revolutions
of modern physics is the following: “I may be wrong and you may be right, and
by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth.”16 This directive is obviously an im-
plication of the ‘loss of certainty’ in modern science, already addressed by James
and others: If we have no criterion at hand that even our ‘best’ scientific theories
are true and if there are rival theories which are not proven to be false it is quite
reasonable to take these theories seriously. This means to tolerate them in a very
special sense: They are possible bearers of truth, or they may at least enable us to
come closer to truth. As alternative candidates to a given theory, they deserve to
be critically examined and checked with respect to their empirical content. Toler-
ance with respect to alternative theories or hypotheses is a necessary precondition
if the scientific enterprise aims at truth or verisimilitude, i.e. truthlikeness or near-
ness to truth.17
However, tolerance in science in this sense has not only an epistemic dimension,
but also an ethical one: Popper asks for a new ‘professional ethics’ of science that
takes human fallibility seriously. It is an ethic directed against epistemic authority
in science, against dogmatic closure of science from criticism and self-criticism,
and for the elimination of individual failure as a social enterprise and for scientific
criticism that is disinterested in personal respects, but as clear and specific as pos-
sible with respect to matters of fact.18 This is Popper’s idea of intellectual honesty
and responsibility in science. It implies scientific tolerance as both an epistemic
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and an ethical virtue. Hans Albert, in his Traktat über kritische Vernunft, states like-
wise that we need such virtues as “bridging principles” [Brückenprinzipien] that
bypass the distance between ethics and science and demand criticism of science
from a normative point of view.19 These bridging principles allow for an under-
standing of epistemic progress that brings about new moral responsibilities, and
for an understanding of moral responsibility that takes into account the available
epistemic means. 
5. CONCLUSION
I closed my short synopsis with critical rationalism because this tradition has several
advantages over other approaches when we want to take tolerance in science seri-
ously: First, it does not combine modern epistemic fallibilism with an inexpensive
epistemic relativism (as Paul Feyerabend did, for example), but adheres to the ideal
that science is a truth-seeking and progressive enterprise. Mere relativism does not
claim tolerance for alien scientific attitudes, but allows for arbitrariness with respect
to such attitudes. This is a fundamental difference. Popper’s approach is preferable
if we want to justify tolerance in science as an indispensible epistemic and ethical
virtue without giving up the idea that science is a rational and progressive enter-
prise. Secondly, I think that an important advantage of Popper’s understanding of
tolerance in science in comparison to the analytical discussion is that he does not
develop tolerance from what he calls ‘the myth of the framework’ (i.e. the convic-
tion of later analytical philosophy that we are captured in a conceptual framework
which is defined by our own language of science and which allows only for a dis-
cussion of philosophical problems that can be formulated within this syntactically
well-defined framework) but acknowledges that there are genuine philosophical
problems that can be addressed in different frameworks. To put it shortly: In the
analytical tradition, tolerance is more of a ‘necessary evil’ of the linguistic frame-
work, in critical rationalism it is a positive virtue in its own right. Thirdly, I think
that Popper’s approach is also preferable in comparison to that of James, because
James and other pragmaticists have basically no opportunity to differentiate be-
tween scientific and non-scientific beliefs, for example religious beliefs. I don’t see
how the specific character of science as an enterprise that aims at truth in a non-
trivial way can be maintained in this tradition. Popper’s approach, however, allows
for a desirable demarcation of scientific and non-scientific beliefs.
I would like to end my synopsis about scientific truth and tolerance with a tiny
observation: Perhaps it is not by accident, but rather an expression of the common
roots of tolerance in the modern philosophy of science in the tradition of the En-
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92.
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lightenment that both Quine and Popper refer to Voltaire as an authority of tol-
erance, and quote the same famous passage from his Dictionnaire Philosophique
when they reflect on ‘tolerance in science’:20
What is tolerance? It is the heritage of our humanity. We all are fallible and
easily fall for error; therefore let us be charitable with respect to our foolery;
this is the first law of nature. 
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